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ABSTRACT
All data and information contained in this investigation are open source and publically available.
The assessment uses six different transboundary animal diseases which are not currently routine
occurrences in the United States and through analytic methods, assesses the likelihood that each
might be used in an agroterrorist attack on the United States’ animal production sector. The
assessment examines each disease using key details that would directly affect the likelihood of
its use in an attack, focusing on potential economic damage. The three main animal populations
considered are bovine, swine, and poultry due to their large size and value in domestic and
international markets.
Information was gathered through several sources. The data on each disease relies heavily on the
United States Department of Agriculture(USDA)and several accredited schools of veterinary
medicine. Most distribution data was accessed from the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) and the World Health Organization(WHO). Where appropriate, the USDA’s own lists
were also included. Additional data were accessed from various sources including bioterrorism
books, news sources, and legal documents.
This study concludes that based on several variables, the foot and mouth disease virus is the most
likely transboundary animal disease to be used by a terrorist organization in an economic
agroterrorist attack on the United States.
Rankings:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Foot and mouth disease(FMD)
High pathogenicity avian influenza(H5N1)
African swine fever(ASF)

Classical swine fever(CSF)
5. Exotic newcastle disease(END)
6. Mad cow disease(BSE)

Key Assumptions:
●

This report deals with terrorist or rogue actors and not nation states.

●

The attack’s goals are mostly economical in nature and not centered on directly
threatening human life.
Ill

●

A rational actor is involved who would use a similar process to evaluate the effectiveness
of different pathogens.

IV

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APHIS - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
ASF - African Swine Fever

BSE - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy “Mad Cow” disease

CAFO - Confined Animal Feeding Operation. The term generally includes sites that contain
several thousand animals in a small area.

CDC — Centers for Disease Control

CFSAN - Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition

CID - Compliance and Investigation Division

DEFRA - Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (United Kingdom)

DHS- Department of Homeland Security

DIVA - Differentiating infected from vaccinated animals

DOI - Department ofthe Interior

DOJ - Department of Justice

DOT - Department of Transportation

v

FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDA — Food and Drug Administration
FMD - Foot and Mouth Disease

Food Defense - Protection from intentional contamination.

Food Safety - Protection from accidental contamination.

FSIS — Food safety and Inspection Service
H5N1 - Common variation of avian influenza. Most cases in this paper deal with HPAI H5N1
which is different from LPAI H5N1.

HPAI- High pathogenicity avian influenza

LPAI- Low pathogenicity avian influenza

MAFF- Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (United Kingdom)

Morbidity - The percentage of susceptible animals that usually become ill after exposed to a
disease.

Mortality - The percentage of ill animals that die from a disease

NASS — National Agricultural Statistics Service

OIE - World Organization for Animal Health (French Acronym)

VI

OIG - Office of Inspector General

Transboundary Animal Disease — This is another term for foreign animal disease. The word
foreign has fallen out offavor as particular diseases have become more mobile across
international borders.

USDA - United States Department of Agriculture

Zoonotic — Diseases which may transfer from animals to human beings
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

There are hvo components: One is economic; the other, operational. Al-Qaeda has rarely
claimed it could or would defeat the U.S. militarily. Instead, it hopes to wear the United States
down economically byforcing the U.S. to spend more on domestic security and remain involved
in costly overseas military commitments. (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010)

The United States is a military behemoth capable of waging fiill scale war on several
fronts. This military prowess, however, does not effectively assist the nation in fighting a war
that is discussed much less often - an economic war.

Al-Qaeda has routinely expressed its intent on waging an economic war with the United
States, as have many other organizations and even nations. Economic warfare is effective,
subtle, and often fails to inspire retaliatory efforts in the same way that attacks like 9/11 do,
which allows an organization to carry out multiple attacks with little consequence.

The United States needs to identify its most vulnerable economic targets and then act in
reasonable ways to safeguard them. As of 2003, the Department of Homeland Security began
listing the agriculture infrastructure of the United States as critical to national security.

Two research questions are posed in this paper:

1. Which diseases are capable of being used in a low cost attack and which are most likely
to be used?
2. Of the diseases considered, which carry the potential to cause the most economic damage
when compared side by side?

1

In order to answer these questions several diseases were compared side by side using a
number of variables. Some research has been done in the area of predicting economic
damages of accidental outbreaks, but each estimate varies wildly in its scope and scenario.
However, by identifying variables that routinely contribute to the economic damage a
particular disease outbreak has, a model was created that allows certain diseases to be easily
compared despite not being able to assess a numerical value.

Additionally, some variables in the model revealed more specific information outside the
realm of economic damages. These variables allow generalizations to be made based on a
particular terrorist or group and their intent. Some organizations may not always prefer the
most economically detrimental disease, though that is the primary research question here.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW: AGROTERRORISM BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

The FBI defines agroterrorism as the deliberate introduction, use, or threatened use, ofa
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive agent against one or more components
ofthefood or agriculture sectors, with the goal ofcausing mortality and morbidity, generating
fear, inducing economic losses, or undermining sector stability and confidence in government
(Southern Nevada InfraGard, n.d.).

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE TO THE U.S.

The United States currently enjoys an enormous international market for its food
products. This success is mostly attributed to its technologically advanced methods of
production, especially in the area of meat products. In most cases, it only takes a handful of
employees to run an operation of several thousand animals. These advances in technology allow
U.S. firms to provide large quantities of edible meat products to consumers. Years ago the
market for U.S. products was limited to where products could be domestically shipped via rail.
However, advances in transportation technology have made it possible for meat products to be
shipped around the world, and the U.S. meat export market directly reflects this revolution.

Advances in the transportation sector have led to a large net gain in the area of
international exports. The United States alone exported over $4 billion worth of pork products in
2009 and as of2008 remains the world’s largest pork exporter according to the USDA’s
Economic Research Service(ERS), which can be seen in Figure 1.

3

Figure 1 - Country Shares of World Pork Exports

Country shares of world pork exports,2008
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Experts also expect the international market to continue growing as the world’s population
increases and more people in developing countries achieve a level of economic stability that
allows them to purchase meat products. Therefore, the United States has a vested interest in
continuing to provide quality products on this market if it wants to continue to reap the economic
benefits.

The pork industry in particular has grown quite substantially in the last ten years. In
2000, the United States exported $1.35 billion in pork products which expanded to $4.33 billion
by 2009, a 220% increase over the course of a decade. The largest jump of the decade occuiTed
from 2007 to 2008 when the market increased from $3.15 billion to $4.88 billion, a 55% increase
in one year and during a devastating economic crisis.

The meat export market proved reliable throughout the economic crisis and suffered far
less across the board than other industries in the United States. This reliability adds to the value
of the market as a whole and provides further incentives to protect it from intentional attacks.
4

Recent animal inventories pulled from the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS)show the size of livestock operations in the United States:

●

Cattle: 93.7 Million head (2010)

●

Swine: 65.8 Million head (2009)

●

Poultry: 449.6 Million head (2009)

AGRCULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The United States has a lot ofland appropriate for raising cattle, poultry, and swine.
However, most livestock is housed in production facilities that may contain several thousand
animals in an area not much larger than a few football fields. The industry has transitioned away
from open fields and outside stalls in order to be more economical through the utilization ofland
and resources(Macdonald & McBride, 2009). Consequently the system from production to
slaughter is quite vulnerable to an attack of biological nature.

In closely confined quarters diseases can spread quickly, especially those which pass
easily from animal to animal through the air and direct contact. Therefore, it would not be
necessary to infect all animals, or even most ofthem at a single site, for an attack to be
successful. Infecting just a few would allow the disease to spread quickly through the rest of the
herd and building within days. Once a herd is infected, the spread ofthe disease off site would
largely depend on how quickly the workers were able to recognize a problem and report it to the
proper authorities. Transboundary animal diseases that look like other more common diseases
further enhance this problem of identification. It can be difficult for licensed veterinarians to
identify diseases not common in the United States, much less an animal handler with little formal
training in disease identification.
5

Most ofthe sites containing animals are not guarded or secured and lack any type of
surveillance equipment, making them very accessible to an unauthorized person. At most, some
sites may have a locked metal gate around the outside and doors with standard locks. None of
these obstacles would be difficult to overpower or surpass, and for the most part are just a
psychological barrier to vandals, not a determined criminal/terrorist. Additionally, some states
and local governments require large buffer zones around animal production facilities due to
environmental concerns, which further alienate the properties. This distance away from
businesses and population centers makes it less likely that law enforcement patrols and programs
like community watches would notice suspicious activity, making the animal production centers
even more vulnerable targets. In some communities, a growing trend has been to pass legislation
which extends these buffer zones. In Missouri, a Court of Appeals recently overturned
legislation that would have added a fifteen mile buffer zone around Arrow Park where a two mile
zone already exists(Missouri Court of Appeals, 2010). The decision was largely based on a
technicality though, which leaves the possibility open for communities to extend zones around
themselves, making it more difficult for these large farms to operate anywhere near traditional
law enforcement. Some areas on the east coast have similar buffer zones extending upwards of a
few miles to make sure a confined animal operation is not located near a major road or
residential area.

Additionally, these rural areas tend to have higher wild animal populations which
contribute to the spread of some diseases such as FMD. No accredited studies have been
conducted on the impact that wild animals such as deer and boar have on the spread ofthe
disease, but they are known to be susceptible and could harbor it for future outbreaks if it became
endemic in the population. However, the likelihood of this being a serious contributing factor is
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small. It would require a major disease event for enough virus to be present in the air for animals
outside the facility to become infected and in the case of a major outbreak the wild animal
population would likely become infected, in some form or another regardless ofthe location of
the initial contamination.

The alienation of sites does carry with it some benefits in terms of biosecurity. By
locating the sites away from population centers and roadways the spread of a disease could more
easily be checked at the infection site. The threat of accidental recontamination is reduced which
might reduce the spread ofthe disease and aide in its containment. Several transboundary animal
diseases can be spread on things like clothing and vehicles, so the isolated sites reduce exposure
and transmission to non-agricultural entities that are not routinely located on farms.

Isolation of animal production facilities will likely continue to grow and therefore, the
industry needs to develop methods of safeguarding facilities or at least making them tamper
evident through surveillance equipment. It is uneconomical for local law enforcement to extend
or increase the frequency of their patrols to reach rural areas with such a low incidence of crime.

The size offarms has increased dramatically over the past several decades due mostly to
the positive benefits of economies of scale. Instead of several thousand small operations, which
produce a few hundred animals a year, the industry has moved to larger operations capable of
producing several thousand animals annually.
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Table 1 - Consolidation in Livestock Production

Consolidation in livestock production, 1987-2002
Farm production median (head sold/removed per year)
1987

1992

1997

2002

Broilers

300,000

384,000

480,000

520,000

Fed cattle

17,532

23,891

38,000

34,494

Hogs

1,200

1,880

11,000

23,400

Table Adapted from “The Transformation of U.S. Livestock Agriculture: Scale, Efficiency, and Risks” / EIB-43 Economic Research
Service/USDA, pg 6.

This trend has created a much larger target for an agroterrorist attack. In most transboundary
animal disease events the entire population of an infected area is “stamped out” in order to
quickly control the disease. Concentrating the majority of animals onto fewer properties exposes
a greater percentage of the population to biological attacks in much the same way large cities
have for human beings. In particular, hog operations have become much more concentrated.
According to the National Agricultural Statistics Service 5,000+ animal operations accounted for
88% of the hog population in 2009. Diseases spread rapidly and even

if checked on one section

of a site, the USDA would still likely cull all animals at the farm to prevent the spread ofsome
diseases. This procedure largely depends on the effectiveness of vaccines and the observed
morbidity rates for whatever strain is being circulated.

Additionally, the reduction in vertically integrated operations on single sites has led to the
need for mass transportation among farms, which presents a soft target for an agroterrorist attack.
This started to arise as each section of production became more specialized, which happened at
different times across the beef, pork, and poultry industries.
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Figure 2- Flowcharts of CuiTent Animal Production Tracts
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Table adapted from ‘Tlie Transformation of U.S. Livestock Agriculture’'(MacDonald & McBride, 2009)

The flowcharts show the different types offarms which are operated within each major industry,
In hog production, only 31% of operations were fan-ow-finish in 2007, meaning those animals
spent their entire lives in a single operation before going to slaughter(MacDonald & McBride,
2009). In the other cases live animals had to be transported from one farm to another at each
stage of production leading up to the slaughter plant. That trend is continuing to grow as it
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becomes more economical to specialize in each stage of production rather than vertically
integrate at the same farm.

Several steps have been taken in the food transportation sector to safeguard products
moving across the country from one site to another such as advanced electronic locking
mechanisms and intelligent transportation systems(ITS) which monitor trucks in real time to
ensure nothing malicious happens while food is in transit. However, similar systems would not
be quite as effective in safeguarding the transportation of animals. Advanced locking systems
would not provide an adequate barrier between a temorist and the animals due to the ventilation
requirements for animals inside the trucks. Figure 3 is an example of a livestock trailer
commonly used. Even an advanced locking mechanism would not prevent the animals inside
from being exposed to a biological agent.

Figure 3 - Image of Animal Transportation Trailer
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Advanced systems for tracking shipments might be effective in preventing a rogue driver from
taking a detour to purposefully infect the animals being transported, but an agroteiTorist attack of
biological nature would not take long to carry out or require extensive equipment and could be
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easily disguised as a routine stop. The employment ofthese systems currently depends on the
trucking company and their budget constraints. There are positive external benefits to these
systems, such as the ability to retrieve stolen trailers and trucks in the event of a theft.

Unfortunately, there does not appear to be much that can be done in terms ofsecuring the
transportation of livestock from one location to another despite the progress made in food
transportation. It is worth noting that the opportunity for an attack is small during these
transports, which usually only last a few hours. Large quantities oflive animals cannot remain
on a trailer for extended periods oftime without food and water which greatly limits the
distances they can routinely travel. Due to this constraint locations and farms are generally only
located a few hours apart. However, rare trips that do exceed 28 hours legally require drivers to
stop and provide animals with food, water, and rest under the USDA’s “twenty-eight hour law
(USDA Food Safety & Inspection Service, 2010). The USDA/APHIS maintains a list of
acceptable areas and stockyards which can be used to rest animals. These sites would also
provide a good location for an agroterrorist attack. Their close proximity to major highways
could lead to a virus being transported quickly across the nation and the animals present are
already in a high stress environment which makes them more susceptible to disease.

LABOR SUPPLY

One of the most effective ways to recruit a terrorist domestically is by using monetary
incentives, especially in times ofeconomic downturn. The agriculture industry in particular is
quite vulnerable to this aspect of recruiting due to the low pay that most employees at the ground
level already receive. A study by Purdue University found that the average laborer on a
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concentrated animal feeding operation(CAFO)in Indiana earned $12.38/hr(2008)(Ayres,
Keeney, DeBoer,& Nennich, 2009). While that wage is higher than other farm related positions,
it is very low relative to the average citizen. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
average full time hourly wage in major occupational groups was $21.90 in 2008. Similarly,
managers who oversee thousands of animals are also paid quite less, $25.74/hr compared to
$34.05/hr in other civilian jobs(Ayers et al., 2009; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008).

The labor market in this industry has a high turnover rate and a large portion is made up
of foreign nationals. Over two-thirds ofthe hired labor on the CAFOs surveyed and some 30
percent of U.S. farm workers are currently immigrants of legal or non-legal status(Keeney,
2008.).
The presence of an employment force where the majority of employees are non-US
citizens makes it reasonable to assess that a non-American terrorist would have little difficulty
gaining access and employment inside such a facility. Additionally, the study found that of the
92 employees on surveyed operations, 26 ofthem had been hired in the last two years(28^ were
new) and 92% of the new hires were to replace departing employees(Keeney, 2008). The high
turnover rate makes the labor market here more accessible from the outside than an industry
where employees routinely stay with the same firm for several years.
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NATIONAL BIOWEAPONS PROGRAMS

Biological anti-animal programs have existed at the national level since at least WWII
when animals played a more tactical role on the battlefield.* Several countries including the
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the USSR all maintained very comprehensive
weapons programs whose goals were to either disrupt the enemy’s food supply or ability to use
animals in tactical situations on the battlefield (Millet, 2006). An additional report to Congress
in 2007 identified other countries which carried out agricultural bioweapon research including
Japan, Iraq, Germany, and South Africa(Monke, 2007). Egypt, North Korea, Rhodesia, and
Syria are thought to have also done some development during the twentieth century(Monke,
2007).

All of these programs were eventually abandoned by the United States in 1969 with the
signing of an anti-biological weapons treaty (Millet, 2006). However, in the time between
WWII and 1969 the United States made significant progress in the field. Working directly with
Canada and the UK,the United States was able to develop multiple strains of several viruses that
are both zoonotic and non-zoonotic in nature. These viruses include, but are not limited to, foot
and mouth disease, classical swine fever, exotic newcastle disease, and African swine fever
(Millet, 2006).

There are no confirmable incidents in which anti-animal pathogens were used by the
United States in any engagements during the Cold War; however, allegations do exist. Cuba has
alleged on several occasions that the United States intentionally introduced animal pathogens not
native to the island following the revolution in 1959(Furmanski and Wheelis, 2006). In one of

The tactical role for animals in WWII was limited, but based on the previous experiences in WWl several countries
relied on animals for food and to move equipment. This continued up through WWII.
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these allegations, an unidentified Canadian agent claims he was paid $5,000 by the Defense
Intelligence Agency(DIA)to travel to Cuba and infect animals with newcastle disease but says
the attack was not carried out(Furmanski and Wheelis, 2006). These allegations are mostly
unwarranted, and there is some CIA documentation to support the claim that these attacks never
occurred. However, there is evidence showing that the United States at least planned biological
anti-crop attacks on Cuba in efforts to destabilize their economy(Furmanski and Wheelis, 2006)
so it is not unreasonable to think attacks on the animal production sector were never planned or
considered. An additional allegation occurred in 1971 when African swine fever was introduced
to the island which was the first outbreak ofthe disease in the western hemisphere, but these
allegations are also largely unsupported (Furmanski and Wheelis, 2006).

Military support for the programs ended in 1952 once their tactical advantage was
largely diminished due to the lack of animals being used on the battlefield (Millet, 2006). Study
continued at an informal level and thus few records exist detailing what went on after 1952.
Plum Island, the primary research facility in the United States, was also turned over by the
military to the United States Department of Agriculture in 1954 (Millet, 2006).

While the United States did not openly use biological anti-animal agents during the Cold
War, there is evidence to suggest that at least the USSR may have during the Afghan war with
the mujahideen (Millet, 2006). Monke’s congressional report in 2007 also cites evidence of the
USSR’s use of a disease called glanders in the Afghan war (2007). The goal ofsuch operations
would have been to limit the mujahideen’s ability to use pack animals and horses for
transportation, which they largely depended on at the time.
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Millet discusses another incident during the civil war in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) where an
unusually large outbreak of anthrax was thought to have been a biological weapons attack
against the animal population (Millet, 2006). In this case, food sources were mostly affected and
the outbreak proved quite detrimental. Due to the natural origins ofthese types of diseases, it is
almost impossible to tell if the outbreak was deliberate or accidental. This continues to be the
case today with biological agricultural threats.

TERRORIST BIOWEAPONS USE

Terrorism’s popular rise in the 20**^ century has also led to the threat of agroterrorist
attacks. Millet explains that as of the year 2000, The Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute in California had identified 853 terrorist incidents and only 25 were classified
as biologically antiagricultural in nature (Millet, 2006). Only four ofthese incidents killed any
animals. Therefore, the awareness and popularity of such acts is far underscored to probably
what it should be considering the potential economic damage.

The United States military does not currently employ many, if any, traditional livestock
on the battlefield. Therefore, the shift of research in the United States has moved, as it should.
towards preventing and handling a strategic type of attack that is economic in nature.
The abandonment of offensive biological anti-animal research does not mean that
research was halted altogether on the diseases. Most diseases which were part of these programs
are naturally occurring, thus countries and businesses continue to do research on live strains of
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the viruses. Access to some of the more sensitive diseases is heavily controlled at various
laboratories around the world and in the United States.^

Research conducted in support of this paper focuses on the natural acquisition ofthese
highly infectious diseases. While it is possible to steal a pathogen from a lab, it is not necessary
in order to acquire a live strain and could pose more risk than some individuals are interested in
taking. Overall however, the process an individual would have to go through in order to carry
out such an attack is virtually risk-free. The operation would look something like this:

1. Choose a disease type and broad target (animal population)
2. Acquire the disease naturally
3. Transport the disease to the United States
4. Deliver the disease to the animal population at one or multiple locations
5. Fade back into society or return overseas before the disease is noticed

At no point in the process would the individual, or group, not be able to deny their intent or
destroy what little evidence existed. Biological pathogens examined here are easily transported
in common products, including frozen meat and even on clothing. Unlike infectious pathogens
that are deadly to human beings, most of the six diseases in this report do not pose a serious
threat to humans. Therefore, they can be carried outside of containment equipment traditionally
used to transport infectious human diseases(Chalk, 2001). Additionally, Chalk states:

According to the Gilmore Commission: "[A] concerted biological attack against
an agricultural tai-get offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which
has a high probability of success." This is important as one of the main factors
that appears to have limited teiTorist experimentation with WMD is a lack of
predictability: the perceived ability to carry out the operation in question with
minimal risk to the terrorists themselves. (Chalk, 2001)
^ Plum Island, the United States’ primary animal disease research facility is discussed in Chapter IV Section a.
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An agroterrorist attack with the potential to cost billions in economic losses therefore lends itself
to a terrorist or group whose intent is not the headline news or mass loss of human life and
destruction. Instead, the attack carries little risk and the potential for huge economic damages.
Additionally, almost every disease can be masked as a naturally occurring outbreak if needed
(Chalk, 2001).

Chalk explains that the ability to mask an attack as natural also opens up the ability to
conduct a type of terrorist attack with purely economic gains in mind. The introduction of a
disease not native to the United States would lead to the culling of millions of animals and have
adverse effects on commodity markets.

Literature in this area remains unclear as to which way the market might move, which is
a key component when considering an attack like this.

An attack that severely crippled the US cattle industry, for instance, would be sure
to result in a major increase in demand, and corresponding price rise, for the
products of the country's major beef and milk competitors. An astute terrorist
could take advantage of this by simply investing in appropriate stock before
carrying out an assault. (Chalk, 2001)
This particular incident has proven true recently(2011)in South Korea, where the price of pork
rose almost twelve percent in January alone in face of a massive foot and mouth disease
outbreak, unprecedented in the country’s history(Mesmer,2011). In contrast, a 2002 rumor that
foot and mouth disease had been discovered in Kansas caused an immediate drop in prices,
which analysts estimate cost the industry almost $50 million (Milbum, 2002). One large
difference between these two incidents is that in South Korea, millions of animals actually had to
be destroyed which adversely affected the supply side of the market(immediate and long term).
In the other case, no animals were destroyed, but instead the rumor drove prices on the Chicago
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Mercantile Exchange down. From these two scenarios two different types of attack become
possible:

1. Perform a limited attack aimed at creating fear and speculation in the market while
not affecting major animal inventories.
2. Perform a large scale attack which leads to the culling or destruction of several
million animals.

Each attack would have different effects on prices and economic damages. The first one might
cause a shortrun downturn in prices and the latter incident would almost undoubtedly lead to
higher prices as more animals had to be destroyed. The effects the zoonotic diseases have is also
relevant. A zoonotic disease, or one perceived to be, would lead to a large decrease in demand,
which would in turn lower prices. The recent HlNl case in 2008 serves as an example. Even
though there was not a health risk in eating pork products, the public perceived there was and
turned away from those markets.

Agroterrorism also lends itself to blackmail due to the ease with which it could be carried
out by almost anyone. A man was arrested on February 11,2011, in South Africa after
blackmailing the United Kindom and United States. The man threatened to release foot and
mouth disease in the two countries if he was not paid $4 million (Smith, 2011). He was caught
in a sting operation by South African authorities working with the FBI and London Metropolitan
Police Counter Terrorism Command. One ofthe key elements when receiving a threat like this
is to look at whether or not the person or group has the ability to carry out their threat, and with
agroterrorism almost anyone does. The fact that economically detrimental diseases that pose no
risk to human health can be used also supports the fact that a broad range of suspects could
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engage in the acli\ ity without moral conllicts. More groups might be willing to carry out an
attack that poses no risk to human heings than those w'ho have reached the point of willingness to
commit murder.

The last type of attack that should be considered is one where the goal is to knock the
United States out of the world market. The United States exports a tremendous amount of meat
products and is the leading supplier in some cases."* An outbreak of almost any transboundary
animal disease almost always immediately leads to embargoes against that particular country and
its affected products. For example, after the United States’ first positive “Mad Cow” disease
case in December of 2003 all major importers of U.S. beef stopped importing. The result of this
case can be seen on the Figure 1.

Figure 4- U.S. Beef Import/Export Timeline
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See Figure I, p. 4
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Last year, 2010. was the first year in which the United States reached its pre-BSE 2003 levels in
terms of heef export value. That statistic is not reflected on the above figure since it only
provides data through 2008.

Japan and Korea, the largest importers of U.S. beef products pre-BSE, shut down their
markets, and they have only slowly reopened them over the last several yeai's and with heavy
restrictions. This statistic can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 5 - U.S. Beef Export Partners Bar Graph
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Following this incident, the hole the United States left in these markets had to be filled by other
exporters.

Other transboundary animal disease incidents would likely have the same short term
effects on the export markets. Mad cow disease, however, seems to have lost its shock value as
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two other cases have occurred in the last eight years, but they seem to have made much less
impact on the export market than the original 2003 case.

Therefore, some producer or group in a foreign country that stood to fill in for the United
States in its world market absence would gain quite substantially off of an outbreak in the United
States.

DISEASE ACCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Plum Island Animal Disease Center(PIADC), located in New York, remains the only
place in the United States where scientists and researchers may study the highly contagious live
foot-and-mouth disease virus as per a Congressional mandate(Department of Homeland
Security, 2010b). In 2003 ownership of the facility was transferred from the USDA to the DHS.
The DHS has made plans to open a new laboratory (the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility), which will be capable of performing the same research in Kansas, but the site will not
be fully operational until 2018(Department of Homeland Security, 2010c).

The physical security at Plum Island has been questioned several times in its history. In
2003, the Government Accountability Office (then the General Accounting Office), released a 46
page report detailing the deficiencies in security on the island and preparedness for an accident.
One of the more alarming findings was that access to pathogens was not being controlled
adequately. Foreign researchers and maintenance workers without completed background
checks were being allowed access into the biocontainment area housing foot-and-mouth disease
without escorts(Government Accountability Office, 2003). Additionally, students were also
being allowed into the biocontainment area without background checks and sometimes without
escorts due to constraints on resources(Government Accoimtability Office, 2003). In 2002 six
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classes with an average of 32 students each were held (Government Accountability Office,
2003). More recently in 2007 the GAO released a statement which said that Plum Island had
come a long way but had still not implemented all oftheir original 2003 recommendations. One
of these key shortcomings was that United States students handling animals infected with FMD
were still not required to go through a background check (Government Accountability Office,
2007). The report does outline several recommendations that were implemented,including the
improvement of armed guards and plans for local law enforcement support if needed(GAO,
2007).

PIADC currently operates as a Biosafety Level 3 facility while the new National Bio- and
Agro- Defense Facility(NBADF)will operate as a Biosafety Level 4 facility, increasing the
capability for new research and testing. The placement ofthe research center remains
questionable based on past incidents involving animal disease research laboratories. A report by
the Congressional Research Service in 2009 estimated that an accidental outbreak offoot and
mouth disease in Manhattan, Kansas could cost upwards of$4.2 billion (Shea, Monke,&
Gottron, 2009). The report ignores the possibility of a terrorist attack on the facility itself while
citing bioterrorism as the main concern for such a new facility. It is important to note that the
GAO released a report shortly after the Department of Homeland Security criticizing their
economic analytic methods and claimed that an outbreak would be much more costly than $4.2

billion.

The only consideration in the congressional report directly comparing the safety of an
island to the mainland comes on page fourteen.

Additionally, policymakers have questioned the efficacy of a water bamer in
preventing animals from swimming to and from an island site and similarly
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whether air currents could carry pathogens from an island site to the mainland.
(Shea et al., 2009)
The additional susceptibility of a mainland facility to terrorist attack versus an island facility is
not mentioned. Each type of facility presents its own strengths and weaknesses, but the older
PIADC is the only site mentioned in the report to receive a “low” site specific risk compared to
Kansas which received a “moderate” assessment(Shea et al., 2009). The difference in the
Department of Homeland Security’s risk assessment is due greatly to the mainland vs. island
factor.

The risk assessment, which ran 418 scenarios, concluded that the highest risk scenario
was one where an inside employee gained access to sabotage the FMD vaccine bank and then
used a live version of the virus on the animal population (Department of Homeland Security,
2010a). This scenario seems equally plausible on an island or mainland facility, thus moving the
site off the island may not affect the outcome of this scenario. Instead, physical security at the
site and added measures for checking the background of researchers and visitors appears to be
the most logical solution. These solutions have long been suggested by government agencies
such as the GAO but as of 2007 were still not being implemented by the Department of
Homeland Security on Plum Island (Governmental Accountability Office, 2007).

The deliberate sabotage of the facility using fire or explosives with something like a
vehicle bom improvised explosive device(VBIED)was not included in the report, but similar
scenarios were assessed such as a small aircraft accident. The conclusion in similar scenarios is
that most of the pathogens would be destroyed by fire and heat in such an event(the report
assumed 99% of pathogens would be destroyed by fire in the aircraft accident case with no
additional explosions apart from the initial impact)(Shea et al., 2009). While moving the facility
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to the mainland may increase its physical exposure and the likeliness of using something like a
VBIED, it seems unlikely that even a successful direct attack would prove any more devastating
than an aircraft accidentally hitting the facility, which was accounted for in the Department of
Homeland Security assessment.

Accidental releases of pathogens are not unheard offor facilities like Plum Island and the
planned NBADF. During one outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom,the live FMD virus was
found outside a facility which was tasked with making FMD vaccines (the NBADF will also be
capable of making vaccines). The strain found was not a type known to have broken out in the
United Kingdom, which led to the assumption that it was most likely released from the facility
(Perlez, 2007). This raises concerns that a live version of a transboundary animal disease virus
might be salvaged from waste products outside a research facility and then applied to animals in
other areas. However, the Department of Homeland Security included the likelihood of
accidental release through waste products in its location risk assessment. Their conclusion was
that it was a low risk incident and that necessary precautions were in place to reduce the
incidence rate to an acceptable level. The assessment did not consider the possibility that
someone might use discarded waste as a means to acquire a disease which otherwise does not
exist in the United States. Despite this, it is unlikely that an individual would know when such
pathogens were accidentally released.
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CHAPTER III

ANALYTIC METHOD

VARIABLES AND COLORS EXPLAINED

The variables examined for each disease are those which have been identified in the
literature and economie modeling to be significant contributors to potential economic damage.
Some scenario estimates compiled by agroeconomists exist for what could happen in the face of
a foreign animal disease outbreak, but none cover the same timeline, situation, or use the same
definitions of damage. Instead, these variables are consistent across all diseases/estimates and
w'ill allow for a basic model to be constructed which can accurately compare each disease.

Each variable is assigned a color pattern that will then be placed into a modified Sleipnir
chart to assist in visualizing the data. Green indicates the disease is less effective and thus less
likely to be used while red (and in two cases, dark red) indicates that it would be more effective
and more likely to be used by a terrorist in an attack. The color progression can be seen in
Figure 6. Not all variables use the ‘dark red’ designator.

Figure 6- Variable Color Scale
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Morbidity: The morbidity rate of a disease directly affects the spread of a disease and how
difficult it would be to employ control measures to limit the disease to a particular section ofthe
country. Diseases with a higher morbidity rate are much more difficult to control and spread
much quicker than those with a lower rate. Higher rates oftransmission make the diseases more
likely to affect multiple areas of the country and also less likely to be controlled in an effective or
timely manner.

●

Green - Typically 0% to 25%

●

Yellow - Typically 26% to 50%

●

Orange - Typically 51% to 75%

●

Red - Typically 76% to 100%

●

Dark Red — Almost always 90-100%

Mortality: Diseases with a high mortality rate have the potential to directly reduce the number
of animals and production capabilities ofthe agriculture system despite the ability ofan animal
to recover. Reductions in production capacity cause higher domestic prices for consumers and
lower the surplus of goods for overseas consumption. They also serve as a psychological factor
by killing mass numbers of animals. However, most diseases require all animals to be destroyed
regardless and this variable is actually a weak contributor.

●

Green - Typically 0% to 25%

●

Yellow - Typically 26% to 50%

●

Orange - Typically 51% to 75%

●

Red - Typically 76% to 100%

●

Dark Red - Almost always 90-100%
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Incubation Period: The incubation period of a disease substantially affects the ability for
producers and handlers to recognize it in a timely manner. Slower incubation periods allow the
disease to spread before symptoms can be noticed. Diseases with quick incubation periods may
be spotted and appropriate control measures implemented before the disease has the opportunity
to spread off the initial infection site. The incubation period is NOT related to the period when
the disease becomes contagious. Animals may be contagious before showing symptoms, which
is commonly the case here.

●

Green - The disease appears very quickly, within 24-48 hours ofexposure.

●

Yellow — The disease may not appear for up to 3-4 days.

●

Orange — The disease may not appear for 5-7 days.

●

Red - The disease may not appear for months or even years.

Target Animal Population: Diseases are limited in their scope to which animals they can
infect. Those that can infect more species spread quicker and affect more international markets.
None of the selected diseases have been known to infect all three populations examined here
(swine, bovine, and poultry).
●

Green - The disease is limited to one market or species.

●

Yellow - The disease is limited to one market but a significant wild animal population
exists which could transport or harbor the disease.

●

Orange - The disease is limited to two markets or species.

●

Red - The disease may infect two separate markets and a significant wild animal
population exists which could transport the disease.
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International Trade: The trade factor is the single largest contributing factor when it comes to
economic damages. The United States exports an enormous amount of agricultural goods, and
once an outbreak occurs, most major trading partners will shut down imports until the disease is
controlled and eradicated. Based on the literature, all the diseases considered here would likely
lead to a shut down in international trade for the products affected until the outbreak was
controlled. The World Organization for Animal Health(OIE)defines a countiy’s status based
largely on whether or not they employ vaccination in controlling the disease. When vaccines are
used, it can take longer to regain the highest status.

Vaccine Effectiveness: The effectiveness of a vaccine largely depends on whether or not the
vaccine can be quickly employed and if so, how effective it would be in stopping the spread of a
disease. In some cases it is not possible to tell whether an animal has been vaccinated or whether
it has simply recovered from the disease. In these cases, international trade would still be
impacted due to the fact that animals may remain carriers for an extended period oftime after
recovering. Diseases without effective vaccines are more likely to be used in an attack than
those for which vaccines exist.

●

Green - Vaccine is effective in stopping the spread ofthe disease, may be employed
quickly, and has been used with positive results.

●

Yellow - Vaccine is effective in stopping the spread ofthe disease, but are not considered
the most effective way of stopping the disease outbreak or may not be employed quickly.

●

Orange — Vaccines have been used with only limited success OR the use of a vaccine
restricts the trade status of a particular country as per OIE guidelines.

●

Red - Vaccines are not effective or practical in stopping the spread of the disease OR no
vaccines currently exist for the particular disease.
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Accessibility of Disease: The accessibility of the disease is one ofthe most important aspects
when evaluating the likelihood of its use in a terrorist style attack. Most foreign countries with
extensive animal populations can acquire just about any disease known through their own labs,
but the situation is different for a terrorist group. They would have to acquire the disease in its
natural environment or buy/steal it from a lab. For this category, the naturally occurring element
is considered.

●

Green - The disease is extremely difficult to acquire or requires extensive knowledge in
biology to utilize.

●

Yellow - The disease is naturally occurring but only in small outbreaks and is usually
controlled quickly, thus limiting the ability to acquire a live sample.

●

Orange - The disease is present in several countries and outbreaks are not uncommon.

●

Red - The disease is rampant in some countries and animals infected with it may remain
carriers for a long time after.

Application/transmission methods: The disease’s ability to be transferred from one animal to
another correlates strongly to its ability to be controlled, the potential success ofthe initial
infection, and the ability to transport the disease. Diseases which can be spread through aerosols
and fomites (inanimate objects) are easier to apply and more likely to be used.
●

Green - Disease cannot be transferred from one animal to another.

●

Yellow - Disease may be transferred from one animal to another, but only by direct
contact or contact with infected materials.

●

Orange - Disease may be transferred from one animal to another via direct contact or
through close exposure (airborne).
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●

Red - Disease is transferable via contact, the air, and routinely through inanimate objects.

Ease of diagnosis: The disease's ability to be diagnosed timely and accurately leads to a quicker
adequate response and cuts dowm on the likelihood of an over response that would waste
economic resources.

●

Green - The disease is unique in symptoms and usually possible to positively diagnose in
the field.

●

Yellow - The disease may be identified in the field but not confirmed without lab results.

●

Orange - The disease's symptoms are not easily identifiable or indistinguishable from
other common diseases.

●

Red - Accurate identification requires laboratory results.

Public Health factor: Overreaction in the public sphere greatly enhances the effects of a
terrorist attack. Diseases which are zoonotic or that have an effect on human health are more
likely to be used than diseases which only affect animals.

Green — Disease poses no risk at all to human beings.
Yellow - Disease may cause irritation or sickness but is not life threatening.
Orange - Disease may freely pass Ifom animals to human beings or has the potential to
cause death in the unlikely event oftransfer.
Red - Disease has the ability to transfer from animals to humans and will likely cause
death when transfer occurs.
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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

TRANSBOUNDARY ANIMAL DISEASES CONSIDERED

High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza HSNl**
Morbidity: With highly pathogenic strains the morbidity rate can approach 100% within two
weeks of exposure to the virus (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Dark
Red

Mortality; Similar to the morbidity rate, the mortality rate can be near 100% in domesticated
birds and escalate quickly, sometimes reaching the 100% mark within 48 hours (Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). Rating: Dark Red

Incubation Period; Individual incubation periods vary between species but t)q)ically it ranges
from 1 -7 days (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Yellow

Target Animal Population: High pathogenicity avian influenza(HPAI) would directly target
domesticated birds and could adversely affect the poultry and egg markets. Wildlife such as
water fowl and turkey are also susceptible to the disease, but have shown greater resistance
(United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Yellow

Trade Factor: The United States has banned all poultry imports from countries that have
outbreaks of HPAI (United States Department of Agriculture, 2007). In the event of an outbreak

Several variations of avian influenza exist. For these purposes the focus is on the H5N1 variation that is highly
pathogenic. Not all variants of H5N1 are highly pathogenic.
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in the United States it is reasonable to think that other countries outside the United States that are
free of the disease would impose similar restrictions ifthe disease were to appear here. Rating:
Red

Vaccine Information: The USDA maintains a vaccine bank for avian influenza. However,the
effectiveness of any influenza vaccination program depends on the ability to match the specific
vaccine with the type of virus prevalent in the environment. Vaccines are not considered an
effective method by the USDA to control avian influenza(United States Department of
Agriculture, 2007). Rating: Orange

Accessibility of Disease: There have not been any cases of highly pathogenic H5N1 in North
America. The virus is limited in its scope to Europe, Russia, Afnca, and East Asia. The disease
would likely appear in Alaska first if it makes it to North America. Consequently, the USDA
currently runs a surveillance program with the help ofthe DOI and University of Alaska.
Between 1998 and 2006 over 12,000 birds were tested in the Alaskan flyway, all negative
(United States Department of Agriculture, 2006). Therefore, access to the virus could prove
difficult especially in recent years with the decline in human cases overseas. Figure 7 shows
each country’s high pathogenicity avian influenza infection status as it was reported to the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE)for the date represented. Cases falling outside the given
date range are not reported. Rating: Orange
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Figure 7 - OIE Disease Distribution Map of HPAI, status as reported for 1 January 2011 through
15 March 2011
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Application/Transinission Methods: Transmission from one flock to another usually occurs
via some type of human involvement such as transporting infected birds, contaminated
equipment, or on the clothes of workers. Airborne transmission of the virus is rare and usually
only within close confines such as poultry houses (United States Animal Health Association,
2008). Rating: Orange

Diagnosis: Highly pathogenic strains of H5N1 will cause sudden deaths in the flock and a
dramatic reduction in egg production (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Onset of
the virus in a population will likely be noticed quickly but possibly not until after the disease has
been spread beyond the initial contamination site. In the event of mass death and loss of egg
production, some strain of avian inlluenza can be assumed. Rating: Yellow
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Public Health Factor: According to the CDC,it is possible for H5N1 to transfer from infected
birds to humans via direct contact, though very rare. It is even rarer for an H5N1 strain to be
transmitted from person to person, thus limiting its potential to become an epidemic. However,
influenza viruses are known for their ability to mutate and change, and thus the possibility
remains. In Asia, Africa, and the Near East mortality rates for humans infected with H5N1 has
been about 60%. H5N1 is resistant to the two antiviral medications licensed by the FDA to treat
influenza (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). Additionally, there is no evidence
to suggest that the virus may be transmitted via contaminated poultry products when cooked
properly(World Health Organization, 2007). Rating: Orange

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy(“Mad Cow Disease”)
Morbidity: Unknown. There are no accurate studies on the morbidity rate in herds exposed to
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Once authorities discover an animal within the herd
has been infected, then the entire herd is culled (United States Animal Health Association, 2008).
Rating: White

Mortality: 100% within six months after symptoms appear. No animals to date have survived
BSE (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Dark Red

Incubation Period: It can take several years for an animal to develop symptoms of BSE after
being exposed to infected feed. Most cases will appear within two to eight years(United States
Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Red

Target Animal Population: The disease is very liberal in crossing species boundaries.
Through experimentation, the disease has been transfen'ed to cattle, sheep, goats, and mice. The
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disease has also occurred naturally in the families of Bovidae, Felidae, and some other non
human primates (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Green

Trade Factor: In 2003, when the United States confirmed its first case of BSE,Japan, South
Korea, Mexico, and Canada all banned beef imports from the United States. Together they
accounted for 90% of the United States beef export market. Prior to the confirmed case, the
United States accounted for 18% of the world beef market. In 2004, that market share fell to 3%
as a result(Hanrahan & Becker, 2008). Rating: Red

Vaccine Information: There is currently no vaccine for BSE. However, at least one program

in

Canada, PrioNet, has received funding to develop a BSE vaccine (PrioNet, 2008). Therefore, it
is possible that vaccines may be available at some point in the future. Rating: Red

Accessibility of Disease: The disease is very difficult to identify without a laboratory. The only
effective method of testing requires tissue from the animal’s central nervous system collected
post-mortem. The OIE has documented 25 countries with confirmed BSE cases. The UK has
the most documented cases with several thousand in the 1990s(Sanchez, World Organization for
Animal Health, 2011). Figure 8 shows countries which reported cases in the given time range.
Rating: Green

35

Figure 8 — OIH Disease Distribution Map of BSE, status as reported for 1 January 2010 through
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Applicatioii/Transmission Methods: The only known method of transmission for BSE is with
contaminated feed. Feed becomes contaminated when parts of an infected animal’s central
nervous system are ground up and reused as feed for other ruminant animals. The United States
currently bans using ruminant protein in feed for other ruminant animals (United States Animal
Health Association, 2008). Rating: Green
Diagnosis: The United States relies on testing parts of an animal’s central nervous system m
order to confidently diagnose BSE. Visual symptoms include loss of coordination, abnonnal
posture, and nervousness or aggression (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). The
United States uses a very extensive BSE surveillance program which tests about 40,000 animals
per year for BSE (United States Department of Agriculture, 2011). Diagnosis of the disease can
be rather easy, but not until long after it has set in. Rating: Yellow

' on- Disease distribution map, ftSF-; cases reported between 1 Jan 2010 and 31 Jtin 2010.
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Public Health Factor: 1 he World Health Organization(WHO)cites the most probable cause of
Variant Creutzteldt-Jakob disease(vCJD)to consuming BSE infected beef. vCJD is extremely
rare and always fatal to human beings. The disease first appeared in 1996 and is strongly linked
to the appearance of BSE in the United Kingdom (World Health Organization, 2002). Because
of this link, BSE carries with it a very high public health risk factor. Rating: Red

Foot and Mouth Disease
Morbidity: Foot and mouth disease(FMD)has an extremely high morbidity rate, approaching
almost 100% in most cases involving domesticated cloven-hoofed animals (United States
Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Dark Red

Mortality: FMD has a very low mortality rate in adult animals, usually less than five percent.
However, in younger animals, such as piglets and calves, the mortality rate can be greater than
twenty percent (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Green

Incubation Period: FMD has an extremely short incubation period. Usually clinical signs
appear within three to five days but may be much shorter ifthere is a large outbreak in the area.
The shortest naturally occurring incubation periods observed have been 24-36 hours, but
scientists have observed incubation periods of twelve hours in an experimental environment
(United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Yellow

Target Animal Population: FMD can infect all cloven-hoofed animals, particularly swine and
bovine. However, it may also infect wild animals such as deer(APHIS,2007). Rating: Red
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Trade Factor: The World Organisation for Animal Health(OIE)recognizes countries that are
completely free of FMD and those that are free but vaccinate. Historically, when a country
experiences an FMD outbreak their trade partners will shut down all meat and animal imports.
After an outbreak it can take several months, or years, to regain the “free without vaccination”
status. Rating: Red

Vaccine Information: Seven different types ofthe FMD virus exist in the world. Ofthose 7
types there are over 60 subtypes. Each subtype requires a different vaccine and therefore, they
do not cross-immunize. A vaccine bank does exist on Plum Island that houses all known
subtypes of the disease. Canada and Mexico also share this bank with the United States.
According to APHIS,the vaccine bank could produce several thousand doses of a needed
vaccine within a few days after isolating the subtype of the virus which can take up to four days.
However, it takes seven to eight days for an animal to develop immunity to FMD after being
vaccinated (United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, 2007b). Rating: Orange

Accessibility of Disease: The United States has not had an outbreak ofthe disease since 1929.
The only place the virus is currently housed in the United States is on Plum Island, a level 3
biosafety facility (United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, 2007b), The disease is prevalent in other parts ofthe world, including East Asia, South
America, Africa, and the Middle East, Notable recent outbreaks have occurred in South Korea
and the United Kingdom. Figure 9 shows how prevalent the disease is. Rating: Red
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Figure 9 - OIE Disease Distribution Map of FMD,status as reported for 1 January 2010 through
31 June 2010
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Application/Transmission Methods: FMD may be transferred from one animal to another in
various ways. According to the USDA,transmission may occur via vvindbome aerosols from as
far away as 60 km, direct contact between animals, through contaminated semen, consumption of
contaminated food, and even via infected inanimate objects (United States Animal Health
Association, 2008). Laboratory tests also indicate that the virus may remain present in a
human’s respiratory system up to 24 hours after being exposed to the virus (United States
Animal Flealth Association, 2008). Animals may spread the disease for several days before
showing any symptoms. It is also possible for an animal to remain infectious for several months
(even years) post exposure. The survivability of the virus in the environment is greatly enhanced
by cold weather (The Center for Food Security & Public Health, 2007). Rating: Red

'’01F-; Disease di.stribution map, FMD cases reported between .lanuary 1.2010 and tune 3 1,2010.
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Diagnosis: Diagnosis of FMD can be very difficult because the virus looks like several other
vesicular diseases. Therefore, accurate diagnosis in the field is impossible and laboratory testing
is needed. Rating: Orange
Public Health Factor: FMD is not a zoonotic disease and poses very little, if any, risk to public
health. Since 1921 only 40 cases have arisen worldwide where humans showed signs ofillness
after being exposed to an FMD infected animal. Each case was mild and self-limiting(CFSPH,
2007). Recently, cases have arisen in South Korea where the culling of millions of animals has
caused public health concerns, but these are not related to the virus and its interaction v^th
humans(Mesmer, 2011). Rating: Green

African Swine Fever
Morbidity: ASF is extremely contagious and usually spreads very quickly once introduced to a
herd. The virus is more abundant in secretions that contain blood (United States Animal Health
Association, 2008). Rating: Red

Mortality: Mortality rates have been observed naturally in a wide range(5% to 100%). In the
onset ofthe disease, however, mortality rates are usually very high and will not come down until
the disease becomes endemic (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Red

Incubation Period: Incubation periods vary from 5-19 days, but symptoms usually develop
within 5-7 days. Exposure to ticks with the virus produces a much shorter incubation period of
less than 5 days(The Center for Food Security & Public Health, 2010). However,the majority of
animals in the United States are housed within buildings making the point about ticks mostly
irrelevant. Rating: Orange
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Target Animal Population: ASF only affects swine and members ofthe swine family (The
Center for Food Security & Public Health, 2010). There are some wild pigs in the United States
which are susceptible, but they are not prominent. Rating: Green

Trade Factor: In recent years the disease has been restricted to sections of Africa, Eastern
Europe, and Russia. The absence of the disease worldwide means that an outbreak in the United
States would likely result in the loss of most major pork trading partners. The disease’s ability to
survive in meat for extended periods of time also lends to this assessment(The Center for Food
Security & Public Health, 2010).

Vaccine Effectiveness: No vaccines for ASF exist(The Center for Food Security & Public Health,
2010). Rating: Red

Disease Accessibility: The disease is rampant in many parts of central Africa and has recently
been introduced to Eastern Europe and Russia which are having problems controlling the
disease. It has never been introduced to the United States. Some animals may become earners
of the disease, though it is unsure how prevalent this is. Ticks may also become prominent
carriers of the disease (The Center for Food Security & Public Health, 2010). Figure 10 shows
current outbreaks as of March 15‘^ Rating: Orange
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Figure 10 - OIE Disease Distribution Map of ASF,status as reported for 1 January 2011 through
15 March 2011

^u^^fd lYeSseTrrs lit

rCZJiSo'^information

Transmission Methods: The disease is typically transferred via direct contact or through eating
infected garbage, l icks and other bloodsucking insects may also transmit the disease. Once
infected, a tick may carry the disease for life. Transmission via aerosols is negligible. However,
the virus is extremely resistant in the environment and can survive for fong periods of time in
blood at low temperatures (1 ‘A yrs at 39°F), frozen carcasses (several years), feces (11 days at
room temperature), or even in boned meat(150 days at 39°F)(The Center for Food Security &
Public Heallli, 2010). The survivability of the disease would make it rather easy to transport
across international borders, especially through the use of something like ticks. Rating: Orange

Diagnosis: Death usually occurs within 7-10 days but the disease presents itself in much the
same way as classical swine fever(CSF), heavy metal toxicity, salmonella, and other swine
related diseases. Laboratory testing is always needed to confidently diagnose the disease (The
Center for Food Security & Public Health, 2010). Rating; Yellow

’’ OIF. Disease distribution map, ASF cases reported between 1 .Ian 201 1 and Present.
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Public Health Factor; ASF does not pose any threat to human beings(The Center for Food
Security & Public Health, 2010). Rating: Green

Classical Swine Fever(“Hog Cholera”)

Morbidity: The morbidity rate of classical swine fever(CSF)depends on the strain of virus and
varies greatly. In very severe cases it can be around 100% for the herd (The Center for Food
Security & Public Health. 2007). Rating: Red

Mortality: Mortality rates also vary drastically depending on the strain of virus. During acute
infections the fatality rate may be close to 100% as well (The Center for Food Security & Public
Health, 2007). Rating: Red

Incubation Period: Typically the incubation period is anywhere from 2-15 days but may not
become evident in the herd for as long as 4 weeks. The drastic variation results from variations
in the strain of virus, dosage amounts, and method oftransmission(The Center for Food Security &
Public Health, 2007). Rating: Orange

Target Animal Population: CSF only exists in swine and wild boar(The Center for Food
Security & Public Health, 2007).

Trade Factor; The United States does not allow the importation of domesticated swine from any
country where CSF is thought to be present as defined by 9 CFR 94.10. It is likely that the few
countries free of CSF would also ban imports on swine products if the United States were to
experience a relapse of the disease. Of these CSF-free countries is Canada and most of Mexico,
two of the largest export markets for United States pork products. Combined, they accounted for
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30% ol all pork exports in 2009. Countries may retain their OIE status of CSF-tree if they use a
vaccine that has a marker (United States Animal Health Association, 2008).

Vaccine Information: Vaccines for CSF do exist; however, the most effective vaccine, which
uses the C strain, does not ha\ e a marker and makes it impossible to differentiate between
vaccinated and infected animals. Two other less effective vaccines with markers exist (United
States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating; Yellow

Accessibility of Disease: It is not uncommon to see outbreaks of the disease outside the United
States. Serbia and Russia have both had major outbreaks as recently as 2010 which are
displayed on the graphic below. Apart from those countries, it is also common in Asia and some
Caribbean islands which can be seen in Figure 11. Rating: Orange

Figure 1 1 - OIE Disease Distribution Map of CSF, status as reported for 1 January 2010 thi'ough
31 June 2010
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OIE Disease distribution map, cases reported between 1 Jan 2010-31 Jun 2010.
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Application/Transmission Methods: Most ofthe disease transfer occurs via direct contact
between animals. The disease has not shown the ability to consistently travel through the air
over great distances and remains relatively fragile in the open environment(The Center for Food
Security & Public Health, 2009). Rating: Yellow

Diagnosis: The virus shows the same symptoms as several other diseases including African
swine fever and salt poisoning. Laboratory testing must be used for accurate diagnosis The
Center for Food Security & Public Health, 2009). Rating: Yellow

Public Health Factor: CSF poses no risk to human beings(The Center for Food Security & Public
Health, 2009). Rating: Green

Exotic Newcastle Disease^

Morbidity: Usually close to 100% in domesticated poultry such as chickens, but varies wildly
depending on the strain (United States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Orange

Mortality: The disease’s mortality rate can vary but is usually in the 70%-100% range (United
States Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating: Red

Incubation Period: The incubation period can vary wildly from 2-25 days but typically ranges
from 2-6 days depending on the strain (The Center for Food Security & Public Health, 2008).
Rating: Orange

This section specifically refers to “exotic" strains which are not native to the United States.
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Target Animal Population: END only affects bird populations and humans in a limited
capacity, but no other animals have shown any type of susceptibility The Center for Food Security
& Public Health, 2008). Rating: Yellow

Trade Precedence: Countries which experience outbreaks ofEND must report it to the OIE and
usually see their trade status lowered. After an outbreak a country must wait 12 months from its
last positive infection to be considered free of the disease. If the country was previously free of
the disease, such as the United States, the time can be reduced to three months if animals are
culled and a surveillance program is in place (World Organization for Animal Health, n.d.).
Rating: Red

Vaccine Effectiveness: Vaccines are available for END and have been used to successfully
control the disease in some areas. Recently the USDA developed an improved vaccine that
reduces shedding of the virus. However, vaccinated birds which are infected may still pass the
disease on to other healthy birds(Durham, 2011). Rating: Yellow

Disease Accessibility: The disease is endemic in some parts ofthe world, including Asia,
Europe, and Africa. Recently, a serious outbreak occurred in Tijuana, Mexico (the first in
Tijuana since 1982) which killed 10,000 birds out of 10,050 confirmed cases(99.5% mortality).
Roughly 21,000 birds were exposed to the disease(48% morbidity). This outbreak began on
January 26^*^, 2011 and has been resolved (World Organization for Aimal Health, n.d.). The
close proximity to the United States and the strong presence of dmg cartels at odds with the
United States government in the region add to the security risk. This incident is not noted in
Figure 12 since it occurred after December 2010. Rating: Orange
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Figure 1 2 - OIF Disease Distribution Map of END,status as reported for 1 July 2010 through

11

December 2010
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Transmission Methods: The disease usually transfers from animal to animal through inlialation
or ingestion ot contaminated materials. Infection can also occur through exposure to
contaminated innate materials such as clothes and equipment. Studies have shown that the virus
can survive in uncleaned poultry houses for up to 30 days during the winter and for 22 days in
soil stored at 68°F. Lower temperatures greatly enhance the survivability of the virus (The Center
for Food Security & Public Health, 2008). Rating: Orange

Diagnosis: The disease shares some similarities with highly pathogenic avian influenza(H5N1)
and may be difficult to diagnose in the field. Laboratory testing is needed to confirm the virus
and strain, but sudden death in the flock and lesions are the first indications (United States
Animal Health Association, 2008). Rating; Yellow

l(>

OIF Disease distribution map, cases reported between 1 .Iiil 2010 and 31 Dec 2010.
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Public Health Factor: END is a zoonotic disease which can infect human beings, usually
causing conjunctivitis. However, handling or consuming infected poultry does not put one at
risk. Instead, most bird to human infection usually occurs in lab workers and vaccination
crewmembers and is resolved without serious incident(The Center for Food Security & Public
Health, 2008). Rating: Yellow

MODIFIED SLEIPNIR CHART

The modified Sleipnir allows several pieces of data(60 here)to be analyzed and
compared simultaneously. The chart can then be used to establish priorities for law enforcement,
intelligence gathering, and policy makers. The technique was developed by Steven Strang ofthe
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
The primary use of the Sleipnir technique is in producing assessments to
recommend strategic enforcement and criminal intelligence priorities to senior
law enforcement officers (Strang, n.d.).
Diseases on this Sleipnir Chart are placed left to right based on their likelihood to be used in an
attack, with the more likely ones placed on the left. White represents an absence ofreliable
information.
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1'igurc 14 - Variable Color Scale and Modified Sleipnir Chart
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The bolded variables, “Public Health Factor” and “Disease Accessibility”, do not relate
directly to the potential agricultural economic damage that could occur given an outbreak.
Instead, these variables and their contribution would depend greatly on the organization or
individual planning the attack.

When applying the key economic variables, the total economic damage potential lor each
disease is as follows:

1 . f oot and mouth disease
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2. High pathogenicity avian influenza
3. African swine fever
4. Classical swine fever
5. Exotic newcastle disease
6. Mad cow disease

However, the likelihood of each disease’s use could change depending on the
group/individual and their intent. An organization that wanted to cause a limited outbreak and
only sway the prices of a particular commodity in the short run would prefer a disease that was
easier to control over something like foot and mouth. Organizations with a dual interest in
causing threats to human health and producing economic damage would undoubtedly choose
avian influenza over foot and mouth as well.

ECONOMIC DAMAGE ESTIMATES AND RECENT INCIDENTS

Below are some estimates released by various governmental and non-govemmental
/
/

agencies on the consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States. In most cases, the
damages are due to lost international trade and vary depending on the spread ofthe disease.
/
/
/
/
/

Recent outbreaks and events oversees are also listed. It is important to note that an outbreak in a
foreign country and the United States could have very different effects. The United States has a
I

much larger agriculture industry than any ofthose listed below, but businesses generally have
much more sophisticated biosecurity programs in place to prevent the spread of infection.

/

\
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●

Estimate: FMD outbreak in California dairy cattle: $2.3 - $69.0 billion (2004$). The
variation largely depends on a detection delay ranging from 7-22 days(Carpenter et all.,
2011).

●

Estimate: A congressional report to Congress in 2007 quoted an estimate made by Price
Waterhouse Coopers stating that an FMD outbreak similar to the one in the United
11

Kingdom could cost between $10.4 and $33.6 billion(Monke,2007).
●

Estimate: The same congressional report quoted a 2002 National Defense University
study which estimated that a limited outbreak of FMD on just 10 farms could still cost the
United States $2 billion (Monke, 2007).

●

Incident: South Korea outbreak 2011 (ongoing): $1.8 billion as ofFebruary 24^. Over
3.39 million animals have been culled (Lina, 2011).

●

Incident: United Kingdom outbreak 2001: About 7 million animals had to be destroyed
costing over $1 1.9-18.4 billion in damages (Carpenter et all., 2011).

'' This estimate assumes that only 7.5 million animals would have to be destroyed. Many other estimates put this
number in the 20+ million range, which makes this one of the more conservative estimates.
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CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION & FUTURE RESEARCH

The trends which make the agriculture system particularly vulnerable to a biological
agroterrorist attack will not change in the near future. Instead, deterrence can only occur through
solid planning and training at the ground level. Employees need to be trained on what to look for
and managers should be aware of when to contact state veterinarians ifthey suspect a disease
outbreak has occurred, whether terrorist activity is suspected or not.

The most thought of and researched disease when talking about this topic is foot and
mouth, and when comparing the characteristics of it with other related pathogens it still comes
out as the most likely choice for a terrorist wishing to do economic damage. The disease is
abundant throughout the developing world, is very survivable, and has characteristics that allow
it to spread from site to site very quickly. The fact that it does not usually kill infected animals
does not affect its rank significantly. The USDA would likely employ a mass culling operation
that would require the destruction of all animals exposed to the disease; therefore the mortality
rate is almost irrelevant.

Mad cow ranks last and that ranking comes with high certainty. The disease is not easily
attainable, the amount of infected feed needed to infect an animal is uncertain, it takes years to
develop, and even if a case develops it might never be noticed. All ofthese factors drive the
disease far down the list despite its ranking quite high in some characteristics. The disease does
not lend itself to being used as a terrorist weapon unless there is a very specific interest at hand
which might be to damage the United States’ ability to export beef products.
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The other diseases each lend to specific targets and could be used effectively, but their
ranking is more ambiguous. Classical swine fever and African swine fever both lend to targeting
swine products while exotic newcastle and avian influenza target poultry production. Each is a
viable option, but they do not pose the same potential threat as foot and mouth.

The group or individual planning the attack remains one ofthe most important aspects.
When looking at specific intent, it becomes much easier to judge the likelihood of a particular
disease’s use. It is unlikely that a pro-environmental organization would attack the animal
population considering the ensuing damage that would result on the animals and environment
which runs contrary to their goals, but it would give them propaganda if it forced the government
to destroy millions of animals out of economic concerns. In this case, a disease which did not
kill the animals but required them to be culled anyway would be appropriate. Again, foot and
mouth disease matches this type of scenario. Mild versions of classical swine fever might work.
but the disease would not be nearly as widespread.

Overall, the agriculture sector provides a soft target for terrorists who may not have taken
the full step towards willingness to take human life, or who may not be willing to put their own
life at risk. It would be almost impossible to spot or detect someone carrying out an attack like
this with the current infrastructure. Instead, effective response and intelligence gathering are the
primary means in limiting an attack to a few hundred million instead ofthe potential $50+ billion
that could occur.
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J

FUTURE RESEARCH

Border security and specifically, biosecurity measures in place at entry points into the
United States, were not examined in this report. The survivability ofthe pathogens considered
here remains uncertain under travel conditions. However, their survivability in cool climate
lends to the idea that it would be more effective to bring them into the United States from across
the Canadian border rather than the border with Mexico where most ofthe national security
focus has been in recent years.

Each pathogen's preference to a particular group and ideology is an area that could be
researched in order to provide an accurate picture of which groups might use which type of
disease. This infonnation could then be used to specifically target groups for intelligence
gathering who might have possible intent.

When dealing with diseases and the tests for them there is a specificity rate which tells
the lab technician how accurate the test is. Most tests have a false positive rate which reveals
how often the test comes back positive when in fact ifs negative. False positives could lead to
an over response by authorities and therefore the accuracy oftests in this field must be as
accurate as possible. However, open source information on the specificity ofthe tests could not
be found.

It is unknown how capable employees and managers are at recognizing most ofthese
transboundary diseases and if identified, how effective a company’s response to an outbreak
would be. The ability to recognize and report a foreign disease outbreak remains the most
effective method of controlling the economic damage, but no open source studies have been
published on employees' ability to recognize disease events. Additionally, most employees are
54

not permanent and therefore frequent re-training would be necessary. Research on the
effectiveness of a training program could provide insight on how to train employees to recognize
infected animals.
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